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Property
By CAROLYN S. BRATT*
Law students, and probably practitioners, are often per-
plexed by the multitude of topics covered under the rubric of
property law. Unfortunately, this Survey article does nothing to
dispel the impression of property law as a hodgepodge of un-
related topics. This Survey of recent decisions discusses topics
ranging literally from "a" to "z"-adverse possession to zoning.
I. ADVERSE POSSESSION
In order to successfully assert a claim of title to land based
on adverse possession, one's possession of the land must have
been open and notorious, actual, exclusive, continuous, and
under a claim of right for the statutory period.' Because these
elements of adverse possession have been subjected to years of
judicial interpretation, it would seem unlikely that surprises in
their application could arise. Nevertheless, the Kentucky Su-
preme Court reached an unorthodox result in a recently decided
adverse possession case. In Humphrey v. Harrison2 the Court
sustained a son's claim of ownership of an undivided one-half
interest in the family farm on the basis of adverse possession.
The son predicated his claim on two factors: his father's invalid
parol gift to him of half of the farm and more than fifteen
years of joint occupation of the farm with his father after the
attempted gift. 3
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. J.D. 1974, Syracuse University. The
author gives special recognition to Karen Greenwell, J.D. 1985, University of Kentucky.
1 7 R. POWELL, Tim LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1013[l] (1984). "Actual" posses-
sion means that the claimant has used the property in keeping with its geophysical
nature. Id. at 1013[2][a]. The "open, notorious and visible" requirement means that
the possessor must do such acts to the land as would put a duly alert landowner on
notice of the possessor's presence. Id. at 1013[2][b]. The requirement of "hostility"
is imposed so as to require possession "which conveys the clear message that the
possessor intends to possess the land as [her or his] own." Id. at 1013[2][c]. Tradi-
tionally, "exclusive" possession must exclude the true owner from possession. Id. at
1013[2][d]. "Continuous" may mean uninterrupted possession although it does not mean
constant. Id. at 101312][e]. "Claim of right" means that the possessor must make
entry to claim the property as her or his own. Id. at 1013[21[f].
2 646 S.W.2d 340 (Ky. 1982).
Id. at 341.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Prior to Humphrey, Kentucky case law had already recog-
nized an exception to the exclusivity requirement in cases of
adverse possession following an invalid oral gift. These decisions
recognized the legitimacy of such a claim even though the would-
be donor of the land continued to occupy the land jointly with
the donee after the attempted parol gift.4 However, the cases
prior to Humphrey clearly required that, after the attempted
gift, the would-be donor must disclaim all continued ownership
of the land, admit that ownership was in the donee, and refrain
from any acts of ownership.5 With such a showing, the donor's
continued presence on the land would not negate the donee's
claim of title by adverse possession.
In Humphrey, however, there was no such showing. In fact,
the father kept one-half of the farm profits and paid one-half
of the farm expenses (splitting both with the son) during the
entire twenty-year period at issue. The father also paid the
annual insurance premiums on the farm and claimed ownership
of the whole both on his federal income tax return as well as
on loan applications. This behavior hardly constitutes a dis-
claimer of all ownership. Indeed, it is not even consistent with
a disclaimer of an undivided one-half interest in the farm.
Perhaps the recipient of an invalid gift of an undivided
fractional interest in land who subsequently jointly occupies the
land with the donor should have some method to perfect title.
In some cases title might properly be established by a claim of
adverse possession of the fractional interest. If the Kentucky
Supreme Court's purpose was to introduce such a novel idea,
Humphrey was a poor case with which to do it. Not only is the
decision at odds with prior case law, but it is unclear whether
the land was ever actually possessed jointly by father and son.
I See, e.g., Owsley v. Owsley, 77 S.W. 397, 402 (Ky. 1903); Ward v. Edge, 39
S.W. 440 (Ky. 1897).
The Humphrey dissent cites Moore v. Terry, 170 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Ky. 1943) for the
proposition that "[w]here property is jointly occupied, the possession of neither occupant
can be deemed adverse to the rights of the other." 646 S.W.2d at 343 (Palmore, J.,
dissenting). However, that case is distinguishable from Owsley and Ward. Moore in-
volved joint occupancy by a man and his children all of whom claimed under their
spouse-mother, whereas Owsley and Ward involved joint occupancy by the purported
donor and donee.
646 S.W.2d at 341 (citing Owsley v. Owsley, 77 S.W. at 401-02 and Layne v.
Norman, 221 S.W. 869, 870 (Ky. 1920)).
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Their acts are as indicative of "a profit-sharing tenant farmer
arrangement as [of] a joint tenancy." '6
II. Wu. s AND TRUSTS
In Conley v. Brewer,7 the Kentucky Court of Appeals ad-
dressed the permissibility of a partial revocation of a will by
physical act when the act is accompanied by an expressed inten-
tion to increase the shares of the other residuary takers. The
testator in Conley validly executed a will containing two separate
gifts for her stepgrandchild.8 The grandchild was given $5000 in
one provision and one-third of the residuary in another provi-
sion. Subsequently, the testator inked out both the general be-
quest of $5000 and the grandchild's name in the residuary clause.
The testator also substituted the phrase "one-half (1/2)" for the
phrase "one-third (1/3)" in the residuary gifts originally made
to the two remaining residuary takers. 9
The grandchild argued that any increase in the shares of the
remaining residuary takers would constitute a new testamentary
disposition. To be valid, such an increase would have to be made
in compliance with the statutory requisites for executing a valid
will or codicil.'0 This increase was not so executed. The court,
however, held that if a devise or bequest is revoked in accordance
6 Id. at 342. The Court recognized the ambiguous nature of the father and son's
financial arrangements but concluded that the son's "actions coupled with the uncon-
tradicted evidence of an unconditional parole gift proven in a clear and convincing
manner makes the quantum leap from tenant farmer to joint tenant." Id.
7 666 S.W.2d 751 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
8 Id. at 751. To digress somewhat, it is not easy to articulate a definition of
"stepgrandchild" in particular or "step" relationships in general. For instance, must a
stepchild be a minor when the natural parent marries in order to create a legal "step"
relationship or is the stepchild's age immaterial? Does the "step" relationship terminate
if the "step" and natural parent divorce? Must one of the child's natural parents be
dead in order for a "step" relationship to exist between the child and the new spouse
of the other natural parent? See Berkowitz, Legal Incidents of Today's "Step" Rela-
tionship: Cinderella Revisited, 4 Fm. L.Q. 209 (1970).
9 666 S.W.2d at 751.
,0 Id. at 753. In Kentucky, no will or codicil is valid unless it is in writing and
subscribed either by the testator or by some person who subscribed the testator's name
in the presence and at the direction of the testator. Moreover, if the will or codicil is
not wholly written by the testator, the testator's subscription must be made or acknowl-
edged by the testator in the presence of at least two credible witnesses. The witnesses
must subscribe their names in the presence of the testator and in each other's presence.
See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394.040 (Baldwin 1978) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
1985]
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with the statutory provisions controlling partial revocation, 1 the
revoked gifts, including revoked residuary gifts, pass to the
remaining residuary takers.' 2 The resulting increase in the resi-
duary takers' shares has no effect on the validity or permissibility
of the revocation. 3
The court reached this result by applying Kentucky Revised
Statutes (KRS) section 394.500 which provides: "Unless a con-
trary intention appears from the will, real or personal estate,
comprised in a devise or bequest incapable of taking effect, shall
be included in the residuary devise contained in the will." Since
the testator's act of inking out the gifts to the grandchild was a
sufficient physical act to revoke 4 the gifts, they were "incapable
of taking effect." The court of appeals held that, under the
statute, the gifts were then included in the residuary devise to
the two remaining residuary takers. 5 Kentucky has now totally
abandoned the rule requiring all failed gifts, wherever they ap-
pear in the will, to pass in intestacy. 6
Although the actual legal issues raised in the other will cases
discussed in this section differ, each case involves a homedrawn
will. Whether the will was a nonholographic, attested instrument
or a holographic, unattested instrument, the drafter's lack of
legal expertise created the opportunity for postmortem litiga-
tion. 17
Before an instrument can be found to be a valid will, it must
not only meet the formal requirements for proper execution, but
" In Kentucky, a will or codicil may be revoked in whole or in part by a subsequent
will or codicil; by a writing executed in the manner of a will declaring an intention to
revoke; or, by the testator, or some person at the direction and in the presence of the
testator, by cutting, tearing, burning, obliterating, cancelling or destroying the will with
the intent to revoke. KRS § 394.080 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
12 See 666 S.W.2d at 754.
"Id.
' See KRS § 394.080(4). See also note 11 supra.
'5 666 S.W.2d at 754.
16 Prior to 1974, KRS § 394.500 provided: "Unless a contrary intention appears
from the will, real or personal estate, comprised in a devise incapable of taking effect,
shall not be included in the residuary devise contained in the will, but shall pass as in
the case of intestacy." See KRS § 394.500 (1942) (amended 1974).
" Although the drafter's lack of legal expertise created the opportunity for liti-
gation, a contest only occurs when the contestant is disappointed by the will provisions.
In fact, if a successful will contest would not leave the contestant better off pecuniarily,
the contestant has no standing to contest in the first place. 2 J. MERIrr, KENTUCKY
PRACTICE § 1253 (1984).
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it must be written with the requisite testamentary intent.18 If the
instrument offered to probate is in traditional will form, the
court will presume that testamentary intent existed at the time
of execution. 19 However, if the instrument is not in will form,
but rather is in the form of a letter or deed or some other
nontestamentary document, the propounders of the will must
establish that it was written with the requisite testamentary in-
tent .
20
In Holtzclaw v. Arneau,21 a handwritten document addressed
"To whom it may concern" and signed by the decedent was
offered for probate. Since the parties agreed that the instrument
was wholly written and signed by the testator, the only question
was whether the document was written with the requisite testa-
mentary intent.
The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the presence or ab-
sence of testamentary intent should be determined by first con-
sidering the plain meaning of the language used in the
instrument. 22 If the language is ambiguous, all the surrounding
circumstances are admissible in discerning the purpose of the
writing. 23 In Holtzclaw the first paragraph of the disputed doc-
ument provided: "In case something should happen to me every-
thing I own or have goes to my wife-Bea-without
reservation." 24 The Court found this language "simply and plainly
expresses the intention that Beatrice inherit all. ' 25 Although the
remaining paragraphs in the document were not dispositive, the
Court found they "[did] not detract from the testamentary char-
acter of the instrument" offered for probate. 26 As the testator's
intention was unambiguously expressed within the four corners
of the instrument, extrinsic evidence was neither needed nor
admissible for the purpose of ascertaining the testator's inten-
tion.27
8 1 Id. at § 642.
E. SCOLES & E. HALBACH, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENT'S ESTATES
AND TRUSTS 123 (3d ed. 1981).
10 See id.
21 638 S.W.2d 704 (Ky. 1982).
11 See id. at 705.
23 Id.
u Id.
25 Id.
1 Id. at 706.
' Id. at 705-06.
1985]
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In addition to complying with the statutory requirements of
formal execution and testamentary intent, a will must also be
dispositive in order to be valid.28 In Atherton v. Byerley,29 the
testator properly executed a codicil to an earlier will. The codicil
directed that all the testator's property was to go to his aunt. It
specifically provided that his two half-siblings were "exclude[d]
from any share in my estate . . . for the reason that they were
unkind to my mother. ' 30 No other provisions were made for the
disposition of the testator's property.
The testator's aunt predeceased the testqtor and had no issue
who survived the testator. Thus, the gift to the aunt lapsed. a'
Because there was no residuary clause to dispose of the lapsed
gift,32 the estate of the testator passed into intestacy. The testa-
tor's half-siblings were his intestate takers under the Kentucky
statutory provisions on descent and distribution a. 3 They there-
fore, to the exclusion of more remote relatives, inherited all of
the testator's property despite the contrary intention expressed
in the testator's will. The only way an intestate taker can be
disinherited is for the testator to direct the disposition of the
property to someone else in a validly executed will.3 4
Gilbert v. Gilbert,35 decided by the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals, is more interesting for the lesson it teaches than for any
point of law it elucidates: Lack of training in the law of wills
can create ambiguities and problems which require expensive and
21 Panke v. Panke, 260 S.W.2d 397, 397 (Ky. 1953).
31 Ky. L. SuMm. 1, at 5 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 1984) [hereinafter cited as
KLS], discretionary rev. denied and Court of Appeals opinion ordered not to be
published, 31 KLS 9, at 33 (Ky. June 27, 1984). Since this is an unpublished opinion,
it has no precedential value. The case is discussed solely as a reminder of already well
established rules.
0 Id.
3, Id. A lapsed gift to an individual is a testamentary gift to a person who was
alive at the execution of the will but who predeceased the testator. In Kentucky, such a
gift can be saved by operation of the anti-lapse statute, but only if the beneficiary is
survived by issue who survive the testator. See KRS § 394.400 (1984).
32 KRS § 394.500 (1978) provides that a lapsed gift shall be included in the residuary
if there is one. See text accompanying notes 7-16 supra for a discussion of how a
revoked will gift passes with the residuary.
33 Under KRS § 391.010(3) (1978), where the decedent has no living issue or
parents, the next class of intestate takers is comprised of decedent's brothers and sisters
or their descendants.
- See KRS § 391.010-.360 (Descent and Distribution).
5 652 S.W.2d 663 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
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lengthy litigation to resolve. The testator in Gilbert had an eight
page typewritten will prepared by an attorney. Two and a half
years after that will was properly executed, the testator wrote
on the back of a business card, "Jim and Margaret I have appro
[sic] $50,000 in Safe. See Buzz if anything happens." On the
back of a pay stub, the testator wrote, "Jim and Margaret
$20,000 the Rest divided Equally the other Living Survivors Bro.
& Sisters." Both holographic writings were dated and subscribed
by the testator. The business card and pay stub were found
folded together in a sealed envelope. 36
The court was asked to determine whether these holographic
instruments constituted a second and superseding will, or whether
they merely served as a codicil to the earlier typewritten will. 37
The court found that the holographic documents comprised a
will which merely modified and did not revoke the earlier will. 38
The Court based its conclusion in part on the lack of an
express revocation clause in the card and pay stub will. Thinking
it very unlikely that a testator would supplant the elaborate
distribution scheme in his typewritten will with directions written
on a pay stub and business card, the court declined to imply a
revocation.39 Finally, the court noted that the money in the safe
referred to by the holographic will was not specifically disposed
of in the typewritten will and would, otherwise, have passed
through the residuary clause.4n The court applied the rule of
construction requiring that a will be construed, if possible, so
as to harmonize seemingly conflicting provisions and so as to
give effect to all provisions. 4' Applying this rule, the court held
that the two holographic writings constituted a second will that
distributed only the money kept in the safe. The rest of the
Id. at 664.
See id. at 665.
" Id. The court of appeals chose to characterize the holographic instruments as a
second will rather than a codicil because the holographic instruments did not refer to
the typewritten will. See id. The choice of labels has no relevance to the resolution of
the problem presented. KRS § 394.010 defines "will" to mean a last will, testament, or
codicil. Also, a testator may have more than one will at a time distributing different
assets of the estate. Id. (citing Muller v. Muller, 56 S.W. 802, 803 (Ky. 1900)).
" See id. at 665.
, Id.
See id. Cf. Stivers v. Mitchell, 314 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Ky. 1958).
1985]
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testator's property passed under the terms of the earlier type-
written will.42
Phillips v. Lowe43 is the only case involving trust law decided
during this Survey period. The Kentucky Supreme Court ad-
dressed, for the first time, whether a person who is both the
settlor and the sole beneficiary of an inter vivos trust may revoke
the trust even though the trust instrument expressly provides that
it is irrevocable. 4 The Court decided in favor of permitting the
revocation. In doing so, the Court adopted45 the position advo-
cated both by the leading commentators on trusts-Scott46 and
Bogert47-and by the Restatement (Second) of Trusts. 4 This
position is based on the fact that the change only affects the
settlor/sole beneficiary. As no purpose is served in refusing the
change in such a case, it should be permitted. 49
III. CONCURRENT OWNERSHIP50
At common law a unique form of concurrent ownership
evolved for wives and husbands-tenancy by the entirety.-' When
a wife and husband held title to land as tenants by the entirety
with right of surviVorship, the husband, during their joint lives,
had the sole right of control, management and enjoyment of the
land. This included a right, subject only to his wife's contingent
right of survivorship, to sell and deliver immediate possession
of the land to another.12 The effect of that contingent right of
survivorship was that if the wife survived, the transfer was
defeated and the wife had full title. Similarly, only the husband's
42 See 652 S.W.2d at 665.
4 639 S.W.2d 782 (Ky. 1982).
, See id. at 783.
41 See id. at 783-84.
46 See 4 SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 339 (3d ed. 1967).
41 See G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 1004, at
523 (rev. 2d ed. 1983).
41 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 339 (1959).
49 See 639 S.W.2d at 784.
'0 Concurrent ownership is ownership of a present estate or future interest in
property by more than one person. See R. CUNNINGHAM & W. STOEBUCK, THE LAW OF
PROPERTY 195-96 (1984).
11 A tenancy by the entirety is a type of joint tenancy based on the common law
idea of the unity of the wife and husband. It can only exist between wife and husband.
R. BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 88 (1981).
52 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 623 (abr. ed. 1968).
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interest in the property could be subjected by his creditors to
satisfaction of his debts. The survival of the wife, however,
would defeat the creditors' claim even in the husband's interest . 3
With the adoption of Married Women's Property Acts, 54 the
growth of women's independence, and creditors' demands for
freer access to their debtor's assets, all but twenty-two states
have eliminated tenancies by the entirety as a form of concurrent
ownership.55 The states which have retained this form of con-
current ownership have significantly modified its attributes from
those it possessed at the common law. In Kentucky, which still
recognizes this form of concurrent ownership, each spouse has
a contingent right of survivorship during the joint married lives
of the spouses. Each spouse can convey his or her own contin-
gent right of survivorship, and the interest can be reached by
that spouse's individual creditors.5 6 However, the transferee of
the spouse's contingent right of survivorship does not get an
immediate right of possession. The transferee receives the right
to possession of the property only if the transferor is the survivor
of the two spouses.5 7
In Peyton v. Young, 58 the Kentucky Supreme Court was
asked to further define the characteristics of Kentucky's tenancy
by the entirety. The husband and wife in Peyton had purchased
their home as tenants by the entirety. The husband thereafter
encumbered his interest by a mortgage in which the wife did not
join. The husband and wife divorced, and the husband conveyed
his interest in the house to his former spouse. Shortly after the
conveyance, the husband killed his former wife and himself. The
Court held that one-half of the property was encumbered by the
mortgage given solely by the husband. The Court reasoned that
the conveyance to his former spouse was a conveyance of his
interest subject to the mortgage.5 9
53 Id.
1' The Married Women's Property Acts were a series of legislative attempts to
mitigate the married woman's legal subjugation to her husband. The first such act was
adopted by Mississippi in 1839. L. KANowirz, WOMEN AND THE LAW 40 (1969).
" See R. POWELL & P. RoAN, supra note 52, at 621.
.6 Id. at 623.
7 Id. See Hoffmann v. Newell, 60 S.W.2d 607, 612 (Ky. 1932).
659 S.W.2d 205 (Ky. 1983).
59 See id.
1985]
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The result in this case is correct despite the Court's misplaced
discussion of statutory and case law concerning murdering joint
tenants. 60 The result in Peyton follows the rule articulated in the
seminal case concerning tenancies by the entirety, Hoffmann v.
Newell.61 In Hoffmann the Court held that a creditor of one of
the tenants by the entirety could force the sale, in satisfaction
of the debt, of the debtor spouse's contingent right of survivor-
ship.62 If a spouse's contingent right of survivorship can be
reached involuntarily by a creditor, certainly the spouse should
be permitted to voluntarily encumber that contingent right of
survivorship by giving a mortgage. When tenants by the entirety
divorce, one of the essential elements of the tenancy-spousal
unity-is destroyed. 63 On divorce the parties become tenants in
common,64 each having an individual undivided one-half interest
which she or he can sell or encumber. In Peyton the husband's
interest in the tenancy in common was already encumbered by
his prior mortgage. Thus, when he transferred his interest to his
former spouse, he transferred an encumbered interest. That he
later killed himself and his former spouse is irrelevant to the
property question. Neither the statutory provision on the rights
of a murdering joint tenant65 nor the case law interpreting that
statute66 is applicable because the parties were not joint tenants
at the time of the murder-suicide. Indeed, the parties were not
concurrent owners of any sort. By virtue of the divorce and
60 The Court states that Cowan v. Pleasant, 263 S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1953) is dispo-
sitive of the issue in this case. See 659 S.W.2d at 207. However, that case dealt with
whether the heirs of a husband who owned property with his wife as tenants by the
entirety were deprived of the husband's interest when the husband killed his wife and
then himself. See 263 S.W.2d at 496.
61 60 S.W.2d 607 (Ky. 1932).
62 See id. at 613.
63 The five unities essential for a tenancy by the entirety are time, title, interest,
possession and person. R. BOYER, supra note 51, at 88.
61 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 52, at 624.
65 KRS § 381.280 (1981) provides:
If the husband, wife, heir-at-law, beneficiary under a will, joint tenant
with right of survivorship or the beneficiary under any insurance policy
takes the life of the decedent and is convicted therefor of a felony, the
person so convicted forfeits all interest in and to the property of the
decedent, including any interest he would receive as surviving joint tenant,
and the property interest so forfeited descends to the decedent's other
heirs-at-law, unless otherwise disposed of by the decedent.
See note 60 supra.
[VOL. 73
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property transfer, the former wife was the sole owner of the
property, one-half of which was encumbered by the husband's
prior mortgage.
IV. MORTGAGES
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Fidelity Fed-
eral Savings & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta67 permits a federal
savings and loan association to include "due-on-sale" clauses in
its mortgages. 68 Such a clause provides that if the property
securing the loan, or any interest in that property, is sold or
transferred without the lender's prior written consent, the lender
may accelerate the loan and declare the entire balance immedi-
ately due and payable. 69 Prior to the Fidelity Federal decision,
some states had attempted to limit the lender's right to exercise
a due-on-sale clause to those instances where the lender dem-
onstrated that enforcement was "reasonably necessary to protect
against impairment to its security or the risk of default."' 70 After
Fidelity Federal, any federal savings and loan association can
exercise a due-on-sale clause in a mortgage whenever the mort-
gagor sells or transfers the land or any interest in the land
regardless of whether the transfer affects the lender's security or
risk of default.7'
Typically, the lender will only permit the sale or transfer for
a price-for example, where the transferee assumes the loan at
a higher interest rate.72 This has sparked attempts to structure
transactions in such a way that they are not characterized as a
sale or transfer. Greater Louisville First Federal Savings & Loan
6 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
" See id. at 170.
69 Often the due-on-sale clause contains exceptions. For instance, the due-on-sale
clause at issue in Greater Louisville First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Etzler, 659 S.W.2d
209 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983), excluded:
(a) the creation of a lien or encumbrance subordinate to this Mortgage,
(b) the creation of a purchase money security interest for household ap-
pliances, (c) a transfer by devise, descent or by operation of law upon the
death of a joint tenant or (d) the grant of any leasehold interest of three
years or less not containing an option to purchase.
Id. at 210.
70 Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 582 P.2d 970, 977 (Cal. 1978).
7 See Fidelity Fed. v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 167.
72 See, e.g., 659 S.W.2d at 210 (one way lenders exercise their rights under a due-
on-sale clause is by requiring new purchasers to buy at a higher interest rate).
19851
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Ass'n v. Etzler7 a involved such an attempt. The arrangement
between the mortgagor/owner and the new purchaser was char-
acterized as an option to purchase rather than as a sale. 74
The "Metro Option Loan Plan" ("Metro Option") at issue
in Greater Louisville was devised in 1980 by a group of Louisville
real estate lawyers75 to "convince the lender that the buyer is
not entering into a sale in which the title of the property is
transferred or the title is conveyed, while at the same time...
protect[ing] the buyer's interest in the property.' '76 The Etzlers,
who had given Great Western a $44,500 purchase money mort-
gage containing a due-on-sale clause, later contracted with Cole-
man under the "Metro Option." Pursuant to the contract,
Coleman paid the Etzlers approximately $18,000 in cash, and
the parties executed a "Metro Real Estate Option" as well as
an "Agreement for Delivery of Deed." The latter was an escrow
agreement providing that the escrowee would hold the deed to
the property until Coleman had paid the entire amount stipulated
in the "Metro Option." The "Metro Option" was properly
recorded and was automatically renewable each year for twenty-
eight years (the term of the Etzlers' mortgage loan). Upon learn-
ing of the Etzler-Coleman transaction, Greater Louisville exer-
cised the due-on-sale clause and declared the full amount of the
Etzler mortgage loan, plus interest, immediately due. When this
amount was not paid, Greater Louisville filed a foreclosure
action.77
A true option transfers neither the ownership of the property
nor any other interest in it.78 Thus, a true option would not
trigger a due-on-sale clause until the option was exercised. The
Kentucky Court of Appeals, however, recognized that the "Metro
Option" was not a true option.79 The Etzlers received a cash
payment from Coleman equal to their equity in the property.
Coleman took possession, paid the taxes, maintained the prop-
erty, and made monthly payments to the Etzlers in an amount
71 659 S.W.2d 209.
74 Id. at 210.
75 Id.
16 Id. at 212.
77 Id. at 210-11.
71 Id. at 211.
79 See id. at 212.
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exactly equal to their monthly mortgage payments to Greater
Louisville. Although this arrangement was called an option, the
parties acted like sellers and buyers of an interest in the property,
not like sellers and buyers of a mere right to acquire an interest
in the property in the future. 0 As the court of appeals correctly
noted, "if something walks like a duck, acts like a duck and
quacks like a duck, it's a duck." 8' The parties intended to have
a transaction with all the attributes of a "sale" while calling it
an "option." According to the court, however, the purpose, not
the name, controls. Thus, the "due-on-sale" clause was triggered
by the arrangement,8 2 and Greater Louisville was within its con-
tractual rights in accelerating the mortgage. 3
V. INCORPOREAL HEREDITAMENTS
Nonpossessory land interests, such as easements and covenants
running with the land, continued to generate controversies during
the Survey period. In Farmer v. Kentucky Utilities Co.,8 4 the
Kentucky Supreme Court considered the permissible scope of
the use of a prescriptive easement. 5 Elliott v. Jefferson County
Fiscal Court16 concerned the applicable criteria for determining
when one may obtain modification or cancellation of a restrictive
deed covenant designed to maintain the residential character of
a subdivision. 87
soId.
81 Id.
SZ Id. at 213.
R3 One of the exceptions to the "due-on-sale" clause was for "the creation of a
lien or encumbrance subordinate to this mortgage." Id. at 210. The Etzlers argued that
the transaction created an equitable mortgage with the Etzlers as mortgagee and the
Colemans as mortgagor. They relied on the decision in Sebastian v. Floyd, 585 S.W.2d
381 (Ky. 1979) which held that a buyer under an installment land sale contract had an
equitable mortgage in the property which was the subject matter of the contract. See id.
at 382. Even if the Etzlers were correct in claiming that their interest in the land was
that of an equitable mortgagee after the "Metro Option" was entered into, the en-
cumbrance is not the type contemplated by the exception. The "due-on-sale" clause
exception for subordinate liens or encumbrances contemplates junior mortgages in which
the Etzlers are the mortgagors not the mortgagees.
" 642 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1982).
81 A prescriptive easement is "[a]n easement . . . created by such use of land, for
the period of prescription, as would be privileged if an easement existed, provided the
use is (a) adverse, and (b) for the period of prescription, continuous and uninterrupted."
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 457 (1944).
- 657 S.W.2d 237 (Ky. 1983).
- Id. All the lots covered by the restrictive covenant were restricted to use as
single-family residences. See id. at 238.
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The utility company in Farmer had an easement by prescrip-
tion to run its wires over the plaintiff's property. The plaintiff
did not dispute the existence of the easement, but rather claimed
that the utility company did not have the right to enter the land
to clear out the vegetation beneath the wires.88
Although the easement was created by prescription rather
than by express grant or reservation, the Court found that the
resolution of the question was the same regardless of the mode
of creation.89 The easement for the overhanging wires included
such use of the servient estate as was reasonably necessary for
the enjoyment of the easement. 9° This included the right to enter
the part of the servient estate over which the wires ran to remove
vegetation or other growth which would interfere with the wires. 91
Elliott involved another private land use device-a restrictive
covenant. The property in question was a vacant corner lot on
the peripheral boundary of a subdivision. All forty-one lots in
the subdivision had been restricted since 1937 by the recorded
plat and deed of restriction filed of record. 92 The lots were
restricted to residential use only. The area outside the restricted
subdivision had become nonresidential with a concomitant in-
crease in traffic on the surrounding streets. The owner of the
restricted corner lot wanted the property released from the res-
idential restrictions because of these changes.
The Kentucky Supreme Court correctly refused to permit
relief from the restriction because of a change which occurred
outside the restricted area.93 Articulating its rationale, the Court
stated: "If border lots are released from residential restrictions,
the ultimate result could be the destruction of whole subdivisions
a domino effect." 94 The argument for the corner lot owner
was cast in terms of an appeal to equity; however, equitable
principles appear to support the Court's decision. The purchaser
of a border lot in a subdivision which is restricted to residential
n Farmer v. Kentucky Utilities, 642 S.W.2d at 580.
19 See id. at 581.
go Id.
91 The case was remanded for a new trial on the issue of whether the cutting of
shrubs, trees and undergrowth by the utility company had been reasonably necessary. If
the company exceeded this limit, it would be liable for damages. See id.
92 Elliot v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 657 S.W.2d at 238.
91 See id. at 239.
"I Id. at 238.
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use knows or should know of the restrictions. Because the border
lots act as a buffer zone for the interior lots in the subdivision,
the purchaser pays a lower price for the lot. If the restrictions
are removed, the purchaser would be unjustly enriched at the
expense of the owners of the interior lots. 95
VI. LEASES
Although decisions involving mineral leases more properly
belong in a discussion of recent decisions on surface mining or
environmental law, there are no such articles in this Survey Issue.
Consequently, since mineral leases are conveyances of an interest
in real property, the Kentucky Court of Appeals' decision in
Kruger v. Holloway 6 is discussed here. It is a case of major
importance which will probably wind up before the Kentucky
Supreme Court.
Previous Kentucky case law indicated that coal lessors were
liable for all of the results of a trespass by their lessee's mining
operations. 97 Such liability seemed to be the preferred rule of
law. Otherwise, the imposition of joint liability on the lessor
and lessee sometimes had to be predicated on the flimsy fiction
of an implied agency relationship.98 In Kruger, however, the
court enunciated a rule of liability for coal lessors of far less
sweeping proportions than that contained in the older cases.
The lessor in Kruger leased the minerals on eighty acres of
land. Unbeknownst to both lessor and lessee, the lessor did not
actually own those minerals. The lease was without a warranty
of title or quiet enjoyment. 99 In the suit brought by the true
owners of the mineral estate against both the lessee and the
91 R. POWELL & P. RoaN, supra note 52, at 684.
No. 83-CA-1509-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 1984). As this Survey was going
to press the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals decision. Hollaway
v. Kruger, 682 S.W.2d 787 (Ky. 1984). The Supreme Court held that the measure of
damages for innocent trespass was "reasonable royalties" if actual royalties did not
meet the standard of reasonableness and that a mineral lease was not the equivalent of
a quitclaim deed so that the lessor could not be held to be a willful trespasser. Id. at
788.
, See Ritchie v. Paine, 431 S.W.2d 498, 501 (Ky. 1968).
" See Kentucky Harlan Coal Co. v. Harlan Gas Coal Co., 53 S.W.2d 538, 543
(Ky. 1932).
9 The court said that a lease without warranty is no more than a quitclaim. See
Kruger v. Holloway, No. 83-CA-1509-MR, slip op. at 5.
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lessor, the trial court imposed liability jointly on both for the
total damage suffered by the true owner because of the lessee's
trespass."°0 The court of appeals held that a lessor who leases
minerals without warranty is liable to the true owner of the
mineral estate for the trespass only to the extent of the royalties
received by the lessor and then only for that amount of damages
which have not been compensated for by the actual trespasser
(the lessee).101 Under some circumstances the lessor, under a
lease without a warranty, may still be held to the same liability
for its lessee's trespass as if the lease had contained a warranty.
This additional liability would be imposed only if the lessor
without warranty was acting in bad faith or had participated
with the trespasser in the trespass, or if there were some other
circumstances which would warrant a finding of liability upon
equitable principles. 0 2
VII. EMINENT DOMAIN/CONDEMNATION
In 1972 the Kentucky General Assembly enacted the Ken-
tucky Wild Rivers Act.' 3 The purpose of the Act was to preserve
certain streams in "their free-flowing condition because their
natural, scenic, scientific, and aesthetic values outweigh their
[present and future] value for water development."' 4 The Act
sought to maintain the primitive character of those streams
designated "wild rivers"'0 5 by imposing significant regulations
on the use of surrounding public and private property.' °0
,00 See id. slip op. at 4-5.
101 Id. slip op. at 9.
102 Id.
103 Kentucky Wild Rivers Act, ch. 117, §§ 1-17, 1972 Ky. Acts 525 (codified as
amended at KRS §§ 146.200-.360 (1980 & Cum. Supp. 1982)). The following discussion
of the history of the Wild Rivers Act and earlier litigation concerning the Act is taken
from Bratt & Brown, Environmental Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 455, 464-68 (1981.82).
,0 KRS § 146.220 (1980).
,OS ee id. KRS § 146.241 (1980) designates eight rivers, or parts thereof, as wild
rivers. KRS § 146.260(1) (1980) directs the Secretary of the Department of Natural
Resources and Environmental Protection to propose other rivers for future addition to
the wild rivers system, subject to approval by the General Assembly.
106 The land use restrictions in designated stream areas originally imposed by the
Act were contained in the Kentucky Wild Rivers Act, ch. 117, § 10, 1972 Ky. Acts 525,
530-31.
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In 1976 the General Assembly amended the Wild Rivers
Act' 0° in response to the litigation in Commonwealth v. Ste-
phens.'08 The amendments purported to authorize compensation
to owners of regulated property only when the state acquired
''easements or lesser interests in or fee title to lands within the
authorized boundaries" of the Wild River system.' 9 The amend-
ments did not make compensation available when the Act merely
restricted a landowner's use of the property." 0 However, the
amendments did ease some land use restrictions contained in the
original Act."'
Prior to the effective date of the amendments, Stearns Coal
& Lumber Company notified the Department for Natural Re-
sources and Environmental Protection (the Department) that it
was about to use its land for every activity that was then pro-
hibited in the Wild Rivers area."2 This obvious challenge to the
validity of the Act was met by a Department administrative
order directing Stearns to discontinue any threatened action until
a hearing was held by the Department." 3 Stearns obtained a
restraining order enjoining the Department from holding any
hearing on its abatement order and filed an inverse condemna-
tion suit-Commonwealth v. Stearns Coal & Lumber."4 Subse-
quent to this, the new amendments to the Wild Rivers Act
became effective. Shortly thereafter the Court held, in Com-
monwealth v. Stephens, that no violation of the Wild Rivers Act
could occur until after the stream area was designated." 5 Ap-
proximately three weeks after the Stephens decision, maps des-
ignating the boundaries of the Wild River system were formally
published by the Commonwealth." 6
The Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in Stearns was ea-
gerly awaited. It seemed that the Court would have to address
,0, See Act of Mar. 29, 1976, ch. 197, §§ 1-11, 1976 Ky. Acts 442 (codified at KRS
§ 146.200-.360 (1980 & Cum. Supp. 1982)).
101 539 S.W.2d 303 (Ky. 1976).
I- See KRS § 146.220 (1980 & Cum. Supp. 1982).
11 See KRS § 146.220 (1980).
See KRS § 146.290 (1980 & Cum. Supp. 1982).
11 See Commonwealth v. Stearns Coal & Lumber Co., 678 S.W.2d 378, 380 (Ky.
1984).
11 Id.
14 Id.
," See Commonwealth v. Stephens, 539 S.W.2d at 308.
116 Commonwealth v. Stearns Coal & Lumber Co., 678 S.W.2d at 380.
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the question it had avoided in Stephens-whether the Act's
prohibitions on land use within the Wild River system constituted
a legal "taking" within the meaning of the fifth amendment to
the United States Constitution and section 13 of the Kentucky
Constitution.11 7 Although the Court in dicta superficially dis-
cussed the current state of "taking" jurisprudence,"" it avoided
a substantive decision on the "taking" issue raised by the Act.
Instead, the Court held, as it had in Stephens,119 that there was
no taking because the Department could not enforce the prohi-
bitions of the unamended Act until the stream areas were des-
ignated. 120 That designation occurred only after the lawsuit was
filed.1 21 The 1976 amendments to the Act were not subject to
review because, like the designation of the Wild Rivers areas,
they too did not become effective until after the filing of the
lawsuit. 22 Although the decision in Stearns may have saved the
Court from having to unravel the knotty issue of when a "tak-
ing" has occurred, the question was merely postponed. More-
over, by failing to address the issue within the context of the
Wild Rivers Act, the Court again left the statute-now more
than twelve years old-still in constitutional limbo. 2 3
"I KY. CONST. § 13 provides: "[Nior shall any man's [sic] property be taken or
applied to public use without the consent of his representatives, and without just
compensation being previously made to him."
See 678 S.W.2d at 381-82.
,, See 539 S.W.2d at 308.
See 678 S.W.2d at 382.
12 Id.
See id. at 383.
,'3 For in-depth discussions of the "taking" issue see: B. AcKERMAN, PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THm CONSTITUTION (1977); Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking
Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 165 (1974); Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A
Decisional Model for the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465 (1983); Dunham, Griggs
v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law,
1962 Sup. CT. REv. 63; Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. Ray. 1165 (1966-67);
Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1097 (1981);
Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 1002-08 (1982); Rodgers,
Bringing People Back: Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Taking in Natural Resources
Law, 10 EcoLoGY L.Q. 205 (1982); Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue
is Still a Muddle, S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74
YALE L.J. 36 (1964-65); Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings and Due Process, 37 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1057 (1980); Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The
Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1970-71).
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In Fearin v. Fox Creek Valley Watershed Conservancy Dis-
trict,124 a landowner sought to enjoin an attempt by the Wa-
tershed District to condemn her land for construction of a dam
and watershed. The landowner alleged that the Watershed Dis-
trict was without power to condemn her land for a dam, which
was partially funded by money from the federal government,
until it complied with the requirements of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act by preparing an environmental impact state-
ment and a cost-benefit analysis. 25
The Kentucky Court of Appeals decided that the Watershed
District could proceed with its condemnation action regardless
of any alleged violations of federal law.'26 The question raised
by the landowner might prevent the Watershed District from
qualifying for federal funds for the project, but the project's
financing is irrelevant in a condemnation action. The question,
according to the court, is whether there is a "public necessity"
for the dam. 27 Once public necessity is established and condem-
nation is accomplished, the Watershed District has eight years
from the taking of possession to commence construction of the
project. 28 If the Watershed District does not qualify for federal
funding because of its failure to complete an environmental
impact statement and a cost-benefit analysis, it may not be able
to build the dam. However, the failure of the condemner to
begin development within the prescribed time period merely en-
titles the landowner to repurchase the property at the price the
condemner paid to the landowner. 129 There is no prospective
relief for a landowner who alleges that the condemner will fail
to qualify for the federal funding needed for the project. 30
VIII. ZONING
In Hall v. Housing Authority of Louisville,'31 property own-
ers in Jefferson County sought to block the Housing Authority's
1- 667 S.W.2d 389 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
115 Id. at 390.
- See id.
127 See id.
2 See KRS § 416.670 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
'2 See id.
See 667 S.W.2d at 391.
' 660 S.W.2d 674 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
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plan to build low-income, scattered-site housing in their neigh-
borhood. The plan called for individual apartment buildings with
four to ten single-family residential units. The apartment build-
ings would not contain public offices or meeting rooms and
access would be limited to the families living in the buildings.
The sites selected for each apartment project were properly zoned
for the contemplated multifamily building. However, the prop-
erty owners alleged that the Housing Authority was required to
submit its plans to the Planning Commission for approval be-
cause the apartment structures were public structures within the
meaning of KRS section 80.110.132 That statutory section pro-
vides:
All low-cost housing projects are subject to the planning,
zoning, sanitary and building laws, ordinances and regulations
applicable to the locality in which the project is situated. In a
city of the first class, the housing authority shall submit to the
city planning and zoning commission the location, character
and extent of any new street, square, park or other public
way, ground or open space, or any public structure or public
utility, for approval in the manner provided in KRS 100. 197.W
The court of appeals determined that scattered-site, publicy owned,
four-to-ten unit apartment complexes are not public structures
within the meaning of the statute."'
According to the court, the mere fact of public ownership is
not determinative of whether the building is within the ambit of
the statute. 35 The use of the building is the relevant factor for
determining whether Planning Commission approval must be
obtained. The court stated:
There is a need for information, planning, and approval for
large public uses of public or private property, and the loca-
tion, character, and extent of such facilities are relevant con-
siderations. Such considerations do not have the same relevance
and need in relation to facilities used by families and relatively
small numbers of individuals, however. 3 6
32 Id. at 675.
133 KRS § 80.110 (1980) (emphasis added by the court).
134Hall v. Housing Authority, 660 S.W.2d at 677.
131 See id. at 676.
136 Id.
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Consequently, prior approval by the planning commission
was not required for the proposed low density, scattered-site
apartment complexes. 37
In Stratford v. Crossman,38 the Kentucky Court of Appeals
held that a writ of mandamus is the appropriate mechanism for
requiring a building inspector and city zoning enforcement of-
ficer to fulfill the duties of their offices. 13 9 Prior litigation had
established that a tavern located in a shopping center across the
street from the plaintiff's townhouse complex violated the local
zoning ordinance.140 The tavern, however, was still operating in
spite of lower and appellate court decisions against it. The
plaintiff sought to compel the appropriate public officials to
abate this zoning ordinance violation.'41
The court of appeals strongly reaffirmed that mandamus is
an appropriate remedy to bring about the resolution of a zoning
issue, stating: "Indeed, without mandamus, a private citizen
would be helpless at the hands of public officials who for one
reason or another chose not to enforce the zoning ordinances." 142
The court held that, upon application for the writ, the applicant
is not required to show either irreparable injury or pecuniary
damage. 143 The writ, if granted, may not direct how the public
official should act or what result must be obtained. 144 The plain-
tiff is only entitled to an order requiring the officials to fulfill
the duties of their offices by acting on the matter presented. 145
The court, however, reminded the officials that they must act
in accordance with the law, and that failure to so act after the
writ is issued would subject them to the power of the court. 146
"' Id. at 677.
,39 655 S.W.2d 500 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
"I See id. at 502.
110 Id. at 501.
14, Id.
MI' Id. at 502.
"' See id.
" Id. at 503.
'5 Id.
'm See id.
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